EU-India Cooperation: Turning Technological Sovereignty into Resilient Supply Chains
India is not seeking technological autarky. Instead, it is trying to reduce single-point dependencies while retaining access to global innovation. The same logic is increasingly shaping European policy. The European Commission’s 2026 technology-sovereignty agenda spans chips, cloud, and open-source AI, while India is building domestic capacity in semiconductors, AI compute, and digital infrastructure. The EU-India summit in January 2026 added a free trade agreement (FTA), a security and defense partnership (SDP), and a strategic agenda to this convergence.
The opportunity is not for the EU or India to replace U.S. or Chinese technology with a new dependency. It is to create trusted, diversified, and resilient technology partnerships.
Laying the Groundwork for Resilience
India’s semiconductor push is moving from incentives toward a full ecosystem. The first Semicon India, a government-funded program, committed about $8 billion to building domestic manufacturing capabilities. In July 2026, Semicon 2.0 expanded the effort to about $13.5 billion, covering design, equipment and materials, fabrication plants (fabs), advanced packaging, research, and talent.
Official data shows that 12 semiconductor projects have been approved across six states so far. Earlier approvals included silicon and compound-semiconductor fabs, memory, and advanced packaging, while the new Design Linked Incentive scheme supports domestic chip-design firms.
This matters for technological sovereignty because fabrication alone does not secure a chip supply chain. Equipment, chemicals, gases, substrates, packaging, design IP, and skilled labor can all become chokepoints. India therefore offers Europe more than lower-cost production: it is becoming an alternative node in an otherwise geographically concentrated value chain. Europe, meanwhile, brings strengths in semiconductor equipment, automotive and power chips, research, and standards. The 2023 EU-India semiconductor Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) already provides a framework for research and development, skills, and supply-chain cooperation.
India’s AI strategy also targets both software and infrastructure. The IndiaAI Mission is expanding public compute access and supporting domestic models and start-ups. India also has a large software-services sector and experience deploying digital public infrastructure at population scale. Unified Payments Interface (UPI)—an Indian instant payment system—Aadhaar (digital ID), and other India Stack components show how interoperable digital rails can reduce dependence on closed platforms. The EU contributes complementary strengths: advanced research, privacy and cybersecurity frameworks, industrial data spaces, and additional AI compute capacity. The two sides have already agreed through the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) to deepen cooperation on AI, high-performance computing, semiconductors, and 6G. At the third TTC in July 2026, they also launched a start-up partnership and emphasized strategic value chains.
Technology is increasingly a security issue, as seen in international conflicts. The EU-India Security and Defence Partnership covers cyber issues, AI and emerging disruptive technologies, critical-infrastructure resilience, space security, and defense-industry cooperation. This creates a basis for treating trusted technology supply chains as part of economic security. India and Europe will still rely on U.S. technologies in advanced AI and on Asian supply chains in semiconductors. The realistic goal is risk reduction, not self-sufficiency.
4 Areas for Deeper Cooperation
Semiconductor Supply-Chain Security
The EU and India should make semiconductor supply-chain security a core TTC workstream. Building on the existing EU-India semiconductor MoU, joint capability mapping should identify dependencies across equipment, materials, chip design, manufacturing, and advanced packaging.
India’s Semicon India and Design Linked Incentive programs should connect more systematically with the EU’s Chips Act 2.0. Government incentives should prioritize diversification, trusted second sources, joint research and development, and cross-border investment rather than duplicating capacity.
India’s strengths in chip design, engineering, and growing manufacturing capacity complement Europe’s capabilities in equipment, research, and specialized chips. Together, the two global powers can build a more geographically distributed and resilient semiconductor ecosystem, reducing strategic dependencies and exposure to geopolitical supply shocks.
Talent as a Strength for Technological Sovereignty
The EU should use its Global Gateway and new talent-mobility architecture to make skills a pillar of technological sovereignty. The European Legal Gateway Office in India, launched in February 2026, is the EU’s first pilot one-stop hub for Indian ICT professionals, students and researchers seeking opportunities in Europe. Separately, the EU Talent Pool, Erasmus+, and Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions create bidirectional pathways for exchanges between engineers and researchers.
These initiatives should all link to semiconductor, AI, and cybersecurity skills needs. Talent mobility should complement, not substitute, capability-building in India. Joint curricula, research placements, and industry training can strengthen both ecosystems and reduce dependence on narrow global talent pipelines.
AI Cooperation
AI cooperation should move beyond governance dialogue. Europe and India should improve reciprocal access to compute, testing infrastructure, datasets, and start-up ecosystems, while developing common approaches to safety and interoperability.
Applied AI in health, manufacturing, climate, and public services offers a practical bridge between Europe’s research strengths and India’s deployment scale. The DEPA initiative, which examines AI in health care between India and France, is a good pilot project.
Digital Public Infrastructure
The EU and India should make digital public infrastructure a pillar of joint development cooperation in the Global South. India brings experience in deploying population-scale, interoperable systems for identity, payments, and public services. Europe brings privacy, cybersecurity, interoperability standards, and development finance. The EU-India Strategic Agenda already calls for jointly deploying interoperable DPI in third countries.
The two sides should use Global Gateway and EU development instruments to co-finance open, secure, and locally governed digital infrastructure, particularly in Africa and the Indo-Pacific. This would build on the EU and India’s 2025 agreement to deepen trilateral cooperation in third countries and complement physical connectivity initiatives, such as the EU-Africa-India Digital Corridor. Joint DPI offers could give partner countries alternatives to closed technology ecosystems while combining India’s low-cost deployment experience with European standards, financing and safeguards.
Ultimately, the EU and India share an unusual position: both want strategic autonomy without technological isolation. Their strengths are also complementary. India offers scale, software talent, digital infrastructure and an expanding manufacturing base. Europe offers advanced industrial technology, research capacity, standards, and regulatory expertise. The policy test will assess whether both can turn those assets into resilient supply chains. Success would mean fewer critical single points of failure, more jointly developed technology, and greater freedom of maneuver when geopolitical shocks disrupt access to essential digital infrastructure.
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